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Possible Ethical Problems with 
Military Use of Non-Lethal 
Weapons 
Stephen Coleman1 
The development and use of new technologies raises a 
number of ethical issues, particularly when the discussion 
focuses on new military technologies. However, a simple 
examination of the legal implications of the use of new military 
technologies fails to include the ethical issues surrounding these 
technologies, especially since law almost inevitably lags behind 
technological developments. The case of non-lethal weapons is 
an interesting one. Existing international law covers the use of 
some specific types of non-lethal weapons while remaining silent 
on others. While there are many reasons why it might be 
attractive to equip military personnel with non-lethal weapons, 
particularly when those military personnel are engaged in 
“operations other than war”, many problematic issues about 
such a decision exist which ought to be highlighted. This paper 
notes some of these problems, including issues that might arise 
in international law with regard to the principle of 
discrimination when non-lethal weapons are used, and problems 
that can arise due to differences between the ways non-lethal 
weapons are tested during development and how those non-lethal 
weapons are used in the real world. This second problem is 
 
1. Senior Lecturer in Ethics and Leadership, School of Humanities & Social 
Sciences and Program Director for Military Ethics, Australian Centre 
for the Study of Armed Conflict and Society, University of New South 
Wales, Canberra. Prior to joining UNSW, he worked for seven years 
teaching ethics to police officers at the New South Wales Police College 
as well as serving as a Research Fellow at the Centre for Applied 
Philosophy and Public Ethics. While working for UNSW, he spent an 
academic year as the Resident Fellow at the Stockdale Center for 
Ethical Leadership at the United States Naval Academy, where he was 
part of a large research project examining the ethical implications of 
various new and developing military technologies which was used to 
help brief the Department of Defense, the US congress and the White 
House on these issues. This paper draws in part on material from three 
previously published sources: Stephen Coleman, Discrimination and 
Non-Lethal Weapons: Issues for the Future Military, in PROTECTING 
CIVILIANS DURING VIOLENT CONFLICT: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL 
ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (David Lovell & Igor Primoratz eds., 
2012); Stephen Coleman, Ethical Challenges of New Military 
Technologies, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
(Hitoshi Nasu & Robert McLaughlin eds., 2014); and STEPHEN 
COLEMAN, MILITARY ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION WITH CASE STUDIES 
(2013). 
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highlighted through discussion of the problems that have arisen 
through police use of non-lethal weapons in domestic law 
enforcement situations. 
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I. Introduction 
The development and use of new technologies raises a number of 
ethical issues, particularly when the discussion focuses on new 
military technologies. However, a simple examination of the legal 
implications of the use of new military technologies fails to include the 
ethical issues surrounding these technologies for two key reasons. 
First, while there is an intimate relationship between the disciplines of 
law and ethics, the questions raised by these two disciplines are not 
the same. Whatever the future may hold, it is impossible to get a 
sense of what the laws governing the use of a new technology ought to 
be without considering the ethical issues raised by that new 
technology. Second, the law almost inevitably lags behind the 
development of new technologies, so it is usually only after a new 
technology has actually been developed that lawmakers start to 
consider how that technology ought to be regulated in law.  
The case of non-lethal weapons (NLW) is an interesting one. 
Existing international law covers the use of some specific types of 
NLW while remaining silent use of other types of NLW, other than 
general provisions applicable to all weaponry used in armed conflicts. 
There are many reasons why it might be attractive to equip military 
personnel with NLW, particularly when those military personnel are 
engaged in operations other than war, a category which includes such 
things as peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions, armed 
humanitarian interventions, and even counter-insurgency operations. 
However, while there are attractions in the idea of issuing NLW to 
military personnel, many problematic issues about such a decision 
exist which ought to be highlighted.  
The term non-lethal weapon is itself rather controversial, leading 
many writers to use other terms when discussing these types of 
weapons. These weapons have been described as soft-kill weapons, 
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less-than-lethal weapons, and sub-lethal weapons, among other terms.2 
All of these terms are somewhat problematic for various reasons, chief 
of which is the fact that virtually any weapon can have lethal effects 
in some situations. So, while recognizing that the term is problematic, 
non-lethal weapons will be used here since it is a term in general use. 
For the purposes of this discussion, the term NLW will be used only 
to describe weapons whose effects are intended to be temporary, 
relatively minor, and reversible. Thus, the definition includes weapons 
intended to have non-lethal effects, but are known to be lethal if used 
in some circumstances. The definition specifically excludes weapons 
intended to maim or cause permanent physical damage of some sort 
to their intended targets, even if they do not kill. 
As was mentioned earlier, law and ethics are very different, but 
many people still seem to conflate the two, thinking that everything 
that is legal must therefore be ethical, and everything that is illegal 
must therefore be unethical. Such thoughts are particularly common 
amongst people who work within the legal system itself, but they are 
also frequently found among members of occupations whose actions 
are greatly restrained by law, such as members of the military. While 
law and ethics are often closely related, they are far from being the 
same thing, and it is not difficult to find examples of situations where 
the demands of law and the demands of ethics come into conflict. 
Something can be: (1) legal, but unethical, such as the apartheid laws 
of South Africa; (b) illegal, but ethical, such as exceeding the speed 
limit to get a critically injured person to the hospital; or (c) ethical, 
but not enforced by law—almost everyone agrees that parents ought 
to love their children, but there are no laws that require it, nor could 
there be any such laws.3 
While the demands of law and ethics do sometimes conflict with 
each other, it is far more usual for them to coincide, and this overlap 
is only to be expected. While some laws are enacted simply to 
maintain stable social interactions or provide social goods, many 
laws—especially criminal laws—articulate ethical principles which are 
deemed to be particularly important. Laws against mala in se crimes 
or torts—such as murder, rape, arson, theft, robbery, assault, and 
battery—exist because of a prior ethical view that it is wrong to 
murder, assault, and steal. Typically, both domestic and international 
law heavily regulate military conduct; however, in terms of the 
discussion of the issues raised by the use of NLW, it is international 
law that is the most important, particularly the law of armed conflict 
 
2. See DAVID A. KOPLOW, NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: THE LAW AND POLICY 
OF REVOLUTIONARY TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE MILITARY AND LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 9–10 (2006). 
3. SEUMAS MILLER, JOHN BLACKLER & ANDREW ALEXANDRA, POLICE 
ETHICS 27 (2d ed. 2006). 
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(LOAC).4 While modern LOAC mostly derives from international 
treaties, conventions, or customary international law, it should be 
recognized that these treaties and customs also have an ethical basis, 
in that they are founded on the requirements of an ethics of war 
which has been discussed and defined over the centuries and has come 
to be known as just war theory. 
II. International Law and Weapons Use 
Just war theory is traditionally taken to have two aspects: jus ad 
bellum, which addresses the right to resort to war rather than 
attempting to resolve a dispute by other means; and jus in bello, 
which addresses the conduct of those who are actually fighting in 
armed conflict, be they uniformed combatants, paramilitary forces, or 
even civilians who have taken up arms.5 When discussing military use 
of NLW, only jus in bello is of interest. Jus in bello consists of two 
main principles by which the participants in the war must abide: (1) 
discrimination; and (2) proportionality.6 These two principles have 
been incorporated into LOAC in a number of ways. There are general 
principles in LOAC which ban indiscriminate and/or disproportionate 
attacks no matter what weapon is used, as well as treaties which ban 
the use of certain types of weaponry because these weapons are 
considered either to be indiscriminate or to cause disproportional 
harm, or both. Anti-personnel land mines, for example, are banned 
because their effect is indiscriminate.7 Biological weapons and cluster 
munitions probably fall into this category as well.8 Some of the 
protocols in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (1980) 
ban the use of weapons considered to cause disproportionate harm. 
This includes protocols banning the use of weapons that disperse 
undetectable fragments and the use of permanently blinding laser 
 
4. See, e.g., NATO Policy on Non-Lethal Weapons, NATO (Oct. 13, 
1999), http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p991013e.htm (“The research 
and development, procurement and employment of Non-Lethal Weapons 
shall always remain consistent with applicable treaties, conventions and 
international law, particularly the Law of Armed Conflict as well as 
national law and approved Rules of Engagement.”)  
5. STEPHEN COLEMAN, MILITARY ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION WITH CASE 
STUDIES 67 (2013). 
6. Id. 
7. United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, 
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their 
Destruction, opened for signature Dec. 3, 1997 2056 UNTS 211.  
8. See Use of Nuclear, Biological or Chemical Weapons: Current 
International Law and Policy Statements, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS (Apr. 
3, 2003) https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5ksk7q. 
htm.  
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weapons.9 In fact, the full name of the Convention—The Convention 
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to 
Have Indiscriminate Effects—clearly demonstrates that the aim of the 
treaty is to enforce the jus in bello principles of discrimination and 
proportionality, at least as far as those principles apply to particular 
types of weapons.10 However, treaties such as these are an imperfect 
attempt to enforce the ethical principles of jus in bello and these 
treaties clearly do not cover every situation.  
The realities of international politics and the difficulties related to 
the negotiation of international treaties mean that international law 
does not ban some weapons that are clearly indiscriminate or 
disproportionate. These same difficulties mean that states are 
prohibited from using some weapons in situations where the use of 
those weapons might well be ethically appropriate. Nuclear weapons 
are probably a good example of a weapon which is not banned, but 
which plausibly ought to be. There is no strict prohibition on either 
the possession or use of nuclear weapons under international law—
indeed, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty actually recognizes 
certain states as possessors of nuclear weapons. Neither is there any 
realistic possibility of the imposition of such a prohibition in the 
future.11 Since international law bans indiscriminate and/or 
disproportionate attacks no matter what weapon is used, it could be 
argued that the use of nuclear weapons is banned despite the lack of a 
specific international treaty on the use of nuclear weapons. 
International law has a blanket application and thus bans the use 
of some types of weapons that could be used in a discriminate and 
proportionate manner, at least in some situations. For example, the 
Hague Convention of 1899 banned the use in warfare of bullets which 
“expand or flatten easily in the human body”, as this type of 
ammunition was thought to cause unnecessary suffering (i.e. to be 
disproportionate).12 The ban on the use of this ammunition is now 
 
9. See Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively 
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Protocol I, opened for 
signature April 10, 1981, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137 (“It is prohibited to use any 
weapon the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments which in 
the human body escape detection by x-rays.”). 
10. See id.  
11. Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/140 (April 22, 1970).  
12. Declaration (IV, 3) Concerning Expanding Bullets, in THE HAGUE 
CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907, ACCOMPANIED BY 
TABLES OF SIGNATURES, RATIFICATIONS AND ADHESIONS OF THE VARIOUS 
POWERS, AND TEXTS OF RESERVATIONS 227, 227(James Brown Scott ed., 
1915). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015) 
Possible Ethical Problems with Military Use of Non-Lethal Weapons 
190 
considered part of customary international law, and has been 
incorporated into the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court as a war crime.13 Yet police officers in most jurisdictions use 
such bullets worldwide for good reason, since they reduce the danger 
of over-penetrating rounds which may cause harm to innocent 
bystanders.14 Thus, it is plausible to think that LOAC should also 
permit military personnel to use such ammunition when they operate 
in environments where there are significant numbers of innocent 
civilians present, since the use of this ammunition would be likely to 
increase the discrimination of military operations in such situations. 
Of immediate interest, in terms of the current discussion of NLW, 
is the ban on the use of non-lethal Riot Control Agents (RCA) as a 
weapon of war, which are included in the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.15 It is obviously possible that these weapons could be 
used in a discriminate and proportionate manner, which would in fact 
reduce the harms of war. It could be argued that international law 
simply has not been able to keep up with the changing nature of 
warfare and that, in modern asymmetric conflicts, it is actually more 
appropriate for military personnel to utilize non-lethal weapons than 
traditional lethal ones. Then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
actually commented on this situation, complaining in testimony to the 
House Armed Services Committee that “[i]n many instances, our 
forces are allowed to shoot somebody and kill them, but they’re not 
allowed to use a nonlethal riot-control agent.”16 On the other hand, 
since the Chemical Weapon Convention allows for the use of RCA in 
law enforcement, including domestic riot control situations,17 it could 
perhaps be argued that the use of RCA is actually permitted in 
military operations other than war. The reason that the Chemical 
Weapons Convention actually bans the use of RCA as a weapon of 
war is almost certainly due to the concern that RCA may be used as 
lethal force multipliers rather than lethal force avoiders. In other 
words, RCA may be used in combination with lethal force, thus 
 
13. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8, ¶ 2(b)(xix), 
opened for signature Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3. 
14. E.g., U.S. Social Security orders 174,000 hollow-point bullets, CBC 
NEWS (Sept. 4, 2012, 8:50AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/u-s-
social-security-orders-174-000-hollow-point-bullets-1.1220907.  
15. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction art. 
I, sec. 5, opened for signature January 14, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.C. 45 
[hereinafter Chemical Weapons Convention]. 
16. Brad Knickerbocker, The Fuzzy Ethics of Nonlethal Weapons, CHR. SCI. 
MONITOR (Feb. 14, 2003), http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0214/ 
p02s01-usmi.html. 
17. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 14, at art. II, sec. 9(d). 
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increasing, rather than decreasing, the lethality of the military 
operations in which such weapons are used.18 
Some types of weapons are banned for cultural or socio-economic 
reasons, where the rationale for such a ban seems to make little sense 
in some places or cultures, but can be much more easily understood 
when examined from a different perspective. The ban on permanently 
blinding laser weapons might fit into this category. Some people 
might regard laser weapons as non-lethal. Nevertheless, while they do 
not directly kill their target, they clearly cause permanent harm. 
A soldier from the U.S., for example, may find it difficult to 
understand why it shooting and killing an enemy is not 
disproportionate, but permanently blinding that same person is. That 
soldier might genuinely believe that it is better to be blind than dead. 
However, a ban on permanently blinding laser weapons will probably 
make much more sense to that soldier if she considers the quality of 
life faced by a blind person in one of the less developed states of the 
world. While a blind person might be able to live a very happy and 
productive life in a developed state, such as the U.S., a similar result 
is extremely unlikely if the blinded person lives in a developing region 
of the world, such as sub-Saharan Africa. Here, a blind person who 
does not have family willing and able to care for them will probably 
be reduced to begging on the street in order to survive. Realistically, 
such a person truly faces Hobbes’ famous state of nature where life is 
“solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.”19 Given this future, one can 
certainly argue that the difference between being shot with a bullet 
and being blinded by a laser is that the bullet will kill its target 
quickly and relatively painlessly, while the blinding laser will condemn 
its target to a long slow death of suffering and starvation. When seen 
in these terms, the claim that permanently blinding laser weapons 
inflict disproportionate harm, and, thus, ought to be subject to a ban 
in international law makes considerably more sense. 
 
18. Id. at art. I, sec. 5 (“Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control 
agents as a method of warfare); MICHAEL CROWLEY, DRAWING THE LINE: 
REGULATION OF “WIDE AREA” RIOT CONTROL AGENT DELIVERY 
MECHANISMS UNDER CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 2 (2013), 
available at http://www.omegaresearchfoundation.org/assets/ downloads 
/publications/BNLWRP%20ORF%20RCA%20Munitions%20Report%20
April%202013.pdf.  
19. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN *84. 
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III. Legal Gap with New Weapons Technologies 
New military technologies might cause problems under jus in bello 
because they are likely to be used in a less-than-discriminate manner, 
or because they might cause disproportionate harm, or both. NLW 
might plausibly provide examples of all of these situations. When the 
principle of discrimination is applied to the use of lethal force, it is 
always applied before the use of that force. LOAC expressly prohibits 
military personnel from deliberately targeting non-combatants.20 
However, many advocates of NLW seem to advocate their use in a 
manner that applies the principle of discrimination after using force, 
rather than before. The following quotation from Michael Gross is a 
good example of this: 
Unlike the use of ordinary weapons, non-lethal weapons 
deliberately target civilian noncombatants so that the harm 
they suffer is no longer incidental but intentional. Targeting 
civilians in this way requires that one subject the principle of 
noncombatant immunity to a ‘lesser evils’ test that compares a 
small amount of intentional harm with a greater level of non-
intentional harm that comes from using high explosives. If the 
former is significantly less than the latter, then there are moral 
grounds to targeting civilian noncombatants with non-lethal 
weapons.21 
There is an actual example of indiscriminate use of NLW which 
can be examined in this regard, since such weapons were used by 
Russian Spetsnaz forces in their response to the Moscow Theatre 
Siege of 2002. Whether this is, strictly speaking, a military example is 
open to debate; nevertheless, this case still illustrates some of the 
problems of discrimination very well. On October 23rd, 2002, forty to 
fifty armed Chechens, claiming allegiance to the militant Islamic 
separatist movement in Chechnya, seized control of a crowded theatre 
in the Dubrovka district of Moscow, about four kilometres southeast 
of the Kremlin. While some of the patrons in the theatre managed to 
escape, the Chechens succeeded in securing some 850-900 hostages 
and threatened to kill these hostages unless Russian military forces 
immediately withdrew from Chechnya. Surreptitious phone calls 
between hostages and those outside the theatre suggested that the 
 
20. See Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War, 114 ETHICS 693, 694 
(2004).  
21. Michael L. Gross, The Second Lebanon War: The Question of 
Proportionality and the Prospect of Non-Lethal warfare, 7 J. MIL. 
ETHICS 1, 15–16 (2008). 
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hostage takers were in possession of small arms, such as assault rifles 
and grenades, as well as mines and other explosives, which some of 
the patrons had apparently seen within the theatre building after the 
Chechens seized control. During negotiations over the next few days, 
the Chechens released approximately two hundred hostages, including 
children, pregnant women, foreigners, and those requiring medical 
care, but the Chechens repeated their threat to start executing other 
hostages if Russian officials did not meet their demands. 
Early in the morning on October 26th, special forces (Spetsnaz) 
from the Russian Federal Security Service surrounded and 
stormed the building. For those inside the building, the first 
indication that an assault was taking place was when gas began 
to appear in the main auditorium where all the hostages were 
being held. The gas, a still unidentified aerosol anaesthetic, 
rendered many hostages and some of the Chechens, unconscious. 
The hostage takers did not detonate any explosives in response 
to the gas, but instead began to fire at Russian positions. After 
a fierce gun battle, which lasted more than an hour, the 
Spetsnaz blew open the front door and entered the auditorium, 
directly engaging those Chechens who remained conscious, and 
apparently executing any who had succumbed to the gas. 
After regaining control of the theatre, the Spetsnaz began 
bringing out the dead and unconscious bodies of hostages who 
had been overcome by the gas. Almost all the hostages required 
medical care due to their inhalation of the gas, but those 
treating the hostages were never told what sort of gas had been 
used in the assault, and apparently were not told that gas was 
even used until after the event, and were thus completely 
unprepared for the mass casualties they had to treat. Two days 
after the siege ended, some 118 hostages had been confirmed 
dead, and of the 646 former hostages who remained hospitalised, 
150 were still in intensive care and 45 were in critical condition. 
At least 33 of the hostage takers and 129 hostages died during 
the raid or over the following days. Despite official Russian 
government claims that none of the hostages died due to 
poisoning, it appears that almost all of the hostages died as a 
result of exposure to the gas, rather than from injuries sustained 
during the exchange of gunfire between the Chechen hostage 
takers and the Spetsnaz.  
An official investigation into the incident by the Moscow 
Prosecutor’s office was suspended in 2007. The investigation 
provided no positive information about: what gas was used; 
whether an antidote had been available; how many hostage 
takers were involved in the siege; how many hostages were 
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released by the operation; or who had decided on the manner of 
the assault and ordered its implementation.22 
The Spetsnaz Forces used NLW in almost the exact same manner 
advocated by Michael Gross. The Russian forces could have simply 
relied on conventional weapons when they decided to storm the 
theatre, and, if they had done so, it is highly likely that many of the 
hostages would have been killed, either by the hostage takers or by 
cross-fire. If such a conventional assault is considered purely through 
the lens of LOAC, then it would appear to follow the principle of 
discrimination because, even if the Russian forces killed some of the 
hostages in the process of assaulting the theatre, they would only 
have been directly targeting the Chechen hostage takers. What 
actually happened was that the Russian forces used a NLW, in the 
form of the anaesthetic gas that they pumped into the theatre’s 
ventilation system. If this actual assault is considered purely through 
the lens of LOAC, however, then it seems to fail the principle of 
discrimination because anesthetizing gas is an indiscriminate 
weapon—everyone in the theatre was a target of the gas, regardless of 
his or her status in the attack. .  
Another NLW which is currently under development, the Active 
Denial System, provides a reasonable example of a new military 
technology which might be thought to cause disproportionate harm—
in this case, harm in novel ways—and which might also be used in an 
indiscriminate manner. The Active Denial System is a heat ray, 
analogous to a giant microwave oven, which can project a beam of 
approximately two meters in diameter at a range of several hundred 
meters.23 Anyone caught in the beam feels an immediate heating 
sensation, away from which they instinctively want to flee. The 
sensation disappears almost as soon as a person is no longer within 
the beam. While the beam can be directed very precisely, the weapon 
can be used in an indiscriminate manner. The agency developing the 
weapon for the U.S. military, the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons 
Directorate, actually suggests that it could be used as a means of 
clearing non-combatants out of an area before engaging those 
combatants who remain.24 But perhaps more problematic is the way 
in which the weapon might cause harm to combatants or non-
 
22. COLEMAN, supra note 4, at 218. 
23. See Non-Lethal Weapons Program, Active Denial System FAQs, U.S. 
DEF. DEP’T, http:// jnlwp.defense.gov/ About/ Frequently Asked 
Questions/ActiveDenialSystemFAQs.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).  
24. U.S. DEF. DEP’T, NON-LETHAL WEAPONS ANNUAL REVIEW 7 (2013), 
available at http:// jnlwp.defense.gov/Portals/50/Documents/ Press_ 
Room / Annual_Reviews_Reports /2013/ DoD_Non-Lethal _Weapons 
_Program_Annual_Review_11.19.2012_HTML_format_v1.pdf.  
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combatants who are not able to escape the beam, such as those who 
have been injured to the point of being hors de combat. 
IV. Discrepancy Between Intent and Application of 
Non-Lethal Weapons 
One particular problem with the use of NLW by military 
personnel concerns the differences in the methods by which NLW are 
actually used in comparison to the methods in which they are tested. 
NLW are tested extensively in the development stage. However, such 
tests occur on healthy individuals, with continual monitoring and in a 
controlled environment. The manufacturers of such weapons stress the 
various precautions that its users must take in order to use these 
weapons safely, and, when they start to advertise the weapons for 
sale, such precautions will be an important part of the sales pitch. 
Even video clips that are released into the public domain in order to 
advertise these NLW, as well as to emphasise how safe they are to 
use, will almost inevitably include warnings about safety 
requirements. In training and in demonstrations, people on whom the 
product is being demonstrated will have medical attention easily 
available. In cases where a person is likely to lose muscle control—
such as when a person is shot by an electro-muscular disruption 
device such as a TASER— precautions are taken to ensure that the 
targeted person either falls onto a padded mat when they lose muscle 
control and/or is caught by another person so as to ensure they are 
not injured when they hit the ground. However, even when there is a 
desire to exhaustively test a new type of NLW, there may still be 
various limits imposed on those tests. Thus, while the Active Denial 
System may have been tested thousands of times on hundreds of 
different individuals, there are legal requirements at play which 
prevent it from being tested on certain groups of people, such as 
children or people with a range of pre-existing medical conditions.25 
In contrast to its testing, when NLW are actually used in the real 
world the situation is very different. While military personnel 
currently do not have much access to NLW , there are many 
paramilitary organizations that do use NLW, especially police forces 
and security companies. These organizations employ NLW on people 
of varying levels of health, and in an environment that is far from 
controlled. In the real world, there are very rarely padded mats for 
people to fall on, or other people around who will ensure that those 
targeted by NLW will not hurt themselves. Nor are careful checks 
performed to ensure that the target of NLW do not have a medical 
 
25. Susan LeVine, Principal Deputy, Strategy & Policy, DoD Joint Non-
Lethal Weapons Directorate, Comments at Panel Discussion on Non-
Lethal Weapons at the 2010 McCain Conference of Service Academies 
(Apr. 23, 2010). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015) 
Possible Ethical Problems with Military Use of Non-Lethal Weapons 
196 
condition which the use of a particular NLW will exacerbate. Thus, it 
is no surprise that people have been killed after being targeted with 
NLW—in some cases, death came as a result of existing medical 
conditions which, had they been known, may have precluded the use 
of the particular weapon against that individual:26 in other cases, 
death came as a result of  injuries sustained while falling.27 
The fact that police officers have access to weapons which are 
intended to be less-than-lethal in their effects also seems to encourage 
the use of such weapons in situations they are not required. The use 
of NLW may have now become an acceptable alternative to the use of 
other tactics, particularly tactics that do not involve any use of force. 
While it is impossible to find clear statistics on the way in which 
NLW are used by law enforcement officers in the U.S., it is a 
relatively simple matter to find examples of situations where such 
officers have resorted to the use of NLW despite it being clear that 
there was no risk of violence against anyone. While police forces may 
initially issue NLW to officers as an alternative to the use of lethal 
force, policies on their use tend to allow the use of such weapons in a 
much wider range of cases. For example, police officers, working 
within their department guidelines for the use of NLW have used: 
•a TASER on a diminutive, seventy-two-year-old woman who 
argued with a police officer after being pulled over for speeding 
in Texas in June 2009;28  
•a TASER on a fan who ran onto the field during a break in a 
major league baseball game in Philadelphia and waved a towel 
to the cheering crowd while attempting to run away from 
security staff in June 2010;29 
 
26. See Anthony Dowley & Matt Schultz, OC Spray Man Dies in Police 
Van on Way to Dandenong Police Station, HERALD SUN (Melbourne) 
(Dec. 22, 2009, 9:59 AM), http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/victoria/ 
oc-spray-man-dies-in-cop-van-heading-to-dandenong-police-station/story-
e6frf7kx-1225812683663 (man suffering from a psychiatric illness died 
after use of a NLW). 
27. Inman Morales died after officers of the New York Police Department 
shot him with a TASER and he fell, head first, more than 10 feet (3 
meters) to the pavement below. See Statement from the New York City 
Police Department, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2008), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2008/09/25/nyregion/25taserletter.html. 
28. Jerome Tuccille, Texas Cop Tasers Great-Grandmother, EXAMINER.COM 
(Jun. 2, 2009), http://www.examiner.com/civil-liberties-in-national/ 
texas-cop-tasers-great-grandmother. 
29. Tased Phillies Fan Sparks Debate, CBS NEWS (May 4, 2010, 6:59 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/tased-phillies-fan-sparks-debate/. 
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•a TASER on a twelve-year-old girl who tried to run away from 
a police officer in Miami in November 2004, a case which is 
especially notable since the officer stated that he never had any 
intention of actually arresting the girl;30 
•a TASER on a bed-ridden, eighty-six-year-old, disabled woman 
who “took a more aggressive posture in her bed”;31 
•pepper spray on a group of seated, unarmed but passively 
resisting protestors at an Occupy Movement protest at the 
University of California, Davis.32 
Police associations and police departments often support the 
introduction of new NLW on the grounds that increased options will 
reduce the likelihood of police officers needing to use deadly force, 
thus reducing the level of risk of harm faced by members of the 
community. However, the procedures for the use of these NLW 
suggest that, in many cases, the concern is not so much about 
reducing the level of risk faced by the community, but rather about 
reducing the level of risk to which the police officers themselves are 
exposed.33 Significantly, while the availability of NLW may actually 
reduce the level of risk faced by police officers, the availability of 
NLW simultaneously reduces the perceived level of risk to which such 
officers can acceptably be exposed. In simple terms, the availability of 
a particular NLW leads to an imperative to use it, often in a much 
wider range of circumstances than was intended when that NLW was 
originally issued. Thus, NLW come to be used in situations that 
would have previously been resolved with the use of less force, or even 
 
30. Susan Candiotti, Police Review Policy After Tasers Used on Kids, CNN 
(Nov. 15, 2004, 8:43 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/11/14 
/children.tasers/index.html?_s=PM:US. 
31. Tim Hull, Police Said to Taze Grandmother, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. 
(June 24, 2010, 12:54 PM), http://www.courthousenews.com/ 
2010/06/24/28330.htm. 
32. Brian Stelter, U.C. Davis to Investigate Use of Pepper Spray at Protest, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2011), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage. 
html?res=9F0DE6D91731F933A15752C1A9679D8B63. 
33. One of the aims of the study of the use of OC spray by Queensland 
Police was to see if the introduction of OC Spray had reduced the 
number of injuries suffered by police. While the study concluded that 
there was no statistical evidence to suggest that the use of OC spray 
had reduced the number of assaults on police or the number of injuries 
suffered by police, it also noted that officers believed the introduction of 
OC Spray had reduced the injuries suffered by police. CRIME AND 
MISCONDUCT COMM’N, OC SPRAY: OLEORESIN CAPSICUM (OC) SPRAY 
USE BY QUEENSLAND POLICE xi (2005), available at http:// 
www.ccc.qld.gov.au/research-and-publications/publications/ police/oc-
spray-oleoresin-capsicum-oc-spray-use-by-queensland-police. pdf. 
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without the use of any force at all. Reviews of the misuse of the 
various types of NLW available to police officers also suggest that the 
more inexperienced or less highly trained an officer is, or both, the 
more likely an officer is to either use NLW inappropriately or resort 
to the use of NLW before such use is really necessary.34 
The range of physical force options, including NLW, which are 
available to police officers are a reflection of the role which they 
perform within society and of the wide range of different situations 
which they might face while performing that role, situations which 
they have been trained to expect and to deal with in the ordinary 
course of their duties. The usual role of military personnel, on the 
other hand, is very different from that of police officers, and the 
training received by military personnel, along with the equipment 
they are issued, reflect this.35 Basic military training is about 
preparing military personnel for combat. In blunt terms it is about 
killing people; in particular, examining who it is legally appropriate to 
kill and when, how and why it is appropriate to kill them. The basic 
equipment with which military personnel are issued is also focussed on 
this task. All the fighting equipment issued to an ordinary soldier is 
designed for one of two purposes: (1) either to help the soldier kill 
enemy personnel; or (2) to protect the soldier from the enemy’s 
attacks. Simply issuing military personnel with NLW will give them 
another use of force option which they do not currently possess. 
Currently, a soldier who engages someone who is thought to pose a 
threat will use lethal force. If it turns out that the soldier made a 
 
34. See, e.g., id. at 32 (noting in addition that younger officers are also more 
representative of spray use on the police force because they are more 
likely to be placed on the frontlines where spray use is necessary); NSW 
OMBUDSMAN, THE USE OF TASER WEAPONS BY NEW SOUTH WALES 
POLICE FORCE 68–69 (2008), available at http://www. ombo. nsw. 
gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/3379/The-use-of-Taser-weapons-
by-NSW-Police-Force-Special-Report-to-Parliament-November-2008.pdf; 
OFFICE OF POLICE INTEGRITY, REVIEW OF THE USE OF FORCE BY AND 
AGAINST VICTORIAN POLICE 58 (2009), available at http:// www. 
ibac.vic.gov.au/docs/default-source/opi-parliamentary-reports/review-of-
the-use-of-force-by-and-against-victorian-police---july-2009.pdf; FED’N 
CMTY. LEGAL CTRS., TASER TRAP: IS VICTORIA FALLING FOR IT? 18–19 
(2010), available at http://www.fclc. org.au/intranet/ public _resource_ 
details.php?resource_id=1668. 
35. It should be noted that in the U.S.A. in particular, many police 
departments now have access to a range of equipment which was 
previously only available to the military. Although the intention in 
providing that equipment may have been to ensure that the police 
would be able to handle counter-terrorism operations, its use in many 
other situations has led to concerns about the militarization of policing.  
E.g., Matt Apuzzo, War Gear Flows to Police Departments, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jun. 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/09/us/war-gear-flows-
to-police-departments.html. 
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mistake and that person was not actually a threat, then clearly it 
would have been better if the soldier had used a NLW rather than 
lethal force. Simply issuing military personnel with NLW, however, 
will not help those military personnel in dealing with situations for 
which they have not really been trained, i.e. those modern operations 
where military personnel are being expected to act like police officers, 
rather than soldiers. Police already appear to be overusing NLW, so it 
can be expected that military personnel will do the same. Given that 
those military personnel are already dealing with situations for which 
their training has not really prepared them (hence the desire to issue 
them with NLW in the first place), they can perhaps be expected to 
rely on NLW even more than police do, a situation which certainly 
seems problematic. 
The final point is perhaps an obvious one, but is nonetheless 
extremely important. Many companies are engaged in various forms 
of research into NLW around the world and the holy grail of such 
research is to develop the perfect NLW; one whose effects are 
temporary and reversible without any medical intervention, but are 
also unpleasant enough to ensure compliance with the directions of 
the user. Groups such as Amnesty International already worry about 
the potential for existing NLW to be used for purposes such as 
torture,36 so it should never be forgotten that the perfect NLW is also 
likely to be perfect for abuse, enabling painful punishment to be 
inflicted on the victim by an unscrupulous user with minimal risk of 
detection. Given the stressful situations which military personnel are 
often placed in, the risk to life and limb that they may face, and the 
tendency of such personnel to de-humanise their enemies, it seems a 
near certainty that some types of NLW would be misused by military 
personnel if they were to be issued to them. This is one final reason to 
be wary about the use of NLW by military personnel. 
 
 
36. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, Amnesty International’s Concerns about Taser 
Use: Statement to the U.S. Justice Department Inquiry into Deaths in 
Custody, AI Index AMR 51/151/2007 (Oct. 1, 2007), available at https: 
//www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/60000/amr511512007en.pdf. 
  
